“Bulgaria should revise its defence investment programme” – Ivan Kostov on the conference “NATO after The Hague 25: the Bulgarian perspective 2025-2035”
06/08/2025

On 31 July we held our high-level conference “NATO after The Hague’25: The Bulgarian Dimension 2025-2035” at the Central Military Club, where Ivan Kostov was a speaker on the panel “Ministerial Conversation – The Hague’25 and NATO’s Strategic Transformation”.

“Today’s defence planning is very difficult, because long-term strategic decisions with a horizon of at least 20 years need to be taken in an environment of extremely rapid development of weapon systems and their means of use, and of rapidly increasing risks. The Strategic Defence Review that we have is rapidly becoming outdated and needs to be updated.

Within this framework, we have three main problems that need to be recognised and addressed openly.

– the current Defence Investment Programme lacks specific deadlines for implementation, does not identify the responsible institutions, and does not specify control and accountability mechanisms. Its aspirational nature risks that public funds allocated to defence will be spent inefficiently.

– the investment programme does not reflect the realities of the new war. Lessons from Ukraine show that digitalisation and artificial intelligence, through which weapon systems act in real time in a coordinated manner, are now crucial. These new capabilities have proven to be more effective than classic heavy platforms, particularly those of the Air Force and Navy, which are vulnerable and unsuited to the dynamics of modern warfare. Without a reassessment of the needs of our armed forces tailored to this transformation, we run the risk of re-equipping ourselves with equipment that is no longer defensively effective.

– the military-industrial complexes in most NATO countries cannot produce a sufficient quantity of new and effective weapons in a short time. Thus, the danger of modernisation being driven not by military necessity but by the capabilities of suppliers comes to the fore. For our country, which relies on the import of modern armaments, this is a critical weakness.

In my view, we need:

First: to revise the Strategic Defence Review, especially in the part of the assessments of the required defence capabilities.

This should be done in the light of the capabilities and prospects of our industry and our own successful research and development activities. The review must take full account of the lessons from Ukraine’s combat experience, particularly the role of drones and of cyberspace as a new theatre of warfare. Only in this way will the review fulfil its primary function – to determine what capabilities we need to build and with what means to defend the country in the new strategic environment.

Since in March 2024 President Putin included Bulgaria among the countries that “actually participate in the war against Russia”, we are obliged to contribute to the construction of a common air and missile defence of Eastern Europe. In February 2025, NATO announced an Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) policy, with the aim of expanding the Eastern Flank’s defence capacity fivefold.

In Europe, the European Sky Shield initiative to jointly equip with IRIS-T, Patriot or Arrow systems is progressing. These decisions are a response to alarming estimates that the Alliance currently possesses only about 5% of the resources needed to effectively defend against Russian attacks on the Baltic and Eastern European states. In order for Bulgaria to fully participate in these solutions, it is necessary to: allocate resources, provide training, prepare logistics and infrastructure and ensure the participation of our industry.

Second: an update of the Investment Agenda should be undertaken, taking into account the new NATO objectives adopted in The Hague. Increasing military spending to 5% of GDP is a major challenge, it requires:

1) a clear articulation of the objectives and time scope;
2) concrete measures and activities with parameters and expected results;
3) setting timeframes responsible institutions for implementation;
4) the provision of resources and accurate budgeting; and
5) management, reporting and control mechanisms.
Only in this way will we avoid the risk of costly and ineffective acquisitions, and ensure that every investment results in the creation of a concrete defence capability that we can sustain and develop.
Third: Bulgaria needs to be a producer, not just a consumer, of armaments. The Council of Ministers should encourage and organise mass Bulgarian production of weapons systems that have proven their effectiveness in real combat – including with Ukrainian know-how. Industrial cooperation with the countries of Eastern Europe can significantly reduce their prices. This requires an aggressive state policy, a commitment to long-term procurement and active coordination between the Bulgarian military industry, the MoD and our allies.

My arguments are pragmatic
We can’t afford an army that upgrades according to the capacity of manufacturers rather than the real needs of defence. We cannot spend significant amounts of money without knowing what – and especially why – we are buying. We cannot remain on the periphery as munitions manufacturers when we have the resources, knowledge and motivation and a developed IT sector of the economy.

The Hague decisions are an extraordinary opportunity to develop high-tech industries in Bulgaria. The MoD needs to realise what a huge resource it will have in the near future and spend it responsibly – in support of the development of our economy.

A profound reform of military education
Alongside the review of capabilities and weapons programmes, the new digital age requires a profound reform of military education. Today’s officer training is built on the notion of warfare conducted according to classical doctrines, with rigid hierarchical command, long decision cycles and weapons of the past. This paradigm is now exhausted.

The war in Ukraine has shown that effective command and control in the face of massive use of drones, sensors, cyber attacks and network warfare requires entirely different competencies.

In other words, we need commanders who think like engineers and engineers who think strategically.

Military academies need to prepare new curricula, introduce courses on cyber operations, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, unmanned platform management and combat logistics in a networked-information environment. This requires not just modernization, but deep structural reform – including partnerships with universities, technology centers, and allied military schools. Without this reform, new weaponry will remain ineffective, and digital modernization will face a personnel and mindset deficit.

In conclusion, I would reiterate that we need to review the Strategic Defence Review and update the Investment Programme:

taking into account this year’s Hague decisions,
building on Ukraine’s experience in defending itself against Russian aggression,
following the principle of efficiency – creating maximum defence capability with every unit of investment, and
developing our high-tech defence industry.
I believe that the Ministry of Defence is already working on this, and I would like us to support it by placing our national interests clearly in the common NATO policy.”

Sources: MEDIAPOOL